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It is now a well-e&tabliahed fact thct high-income and highly-edu~t$d per&ons in the United State& ~re healthier than their poorer end le&a-oducated counterparto <Taubaan and Rosen, 1982; Fucha, 1985>. In part becauaa of concern &bout inco~e disparities in health, public resources have been allocated to subsidize medical care to vulnerable, poor populations in the United Stetes <Coraan and Gt·ossaan, 1985>. For exa~ple, the Medicaid program, enacted in 1965, finances Medical service& for poor faailiea who are eligible for Aid to Faailiea with Dependent Children. Medicare provides siailar subsidies to the old; 6aendaents to Title V of the Social Security Act of 1963 authorize federal grants to facilitate the provision of prenatal and obstetrical care to low-. incoae populations in "aedically underserved" localities, and the Woaen. Infants and Children CWIC> prograa, begun in 1983, provides grants to local agencies for the provision of food supple:aents to pregnant and lactating wo11en.
Coexisting with thase federal health subsidies directed to low-incoae 9roups the federal tax code peraits ~edical expenditures to be deducted fro• gross taxble incoas <though restrictions have tightened over the years>. This "tax subsidization" <Pauly, 1986> of 11edical care clearly benefits 111ost persona with high incomes confronting high Marginal tax rates. The pervasiveness of untaxed heal th benefit's in co111pensation packages of full-the workers is yet another way tax policy subsidizes health care for selected groups. It is thus unclear what the nt:~t distributional consequence£> are o:f these varied ·inter-ventions in health care pricing.
Despite conce~n about inequities in health care, little is known about the distribution of tht1 actual use of aedical services across groups defined by inco11e, education, r~ce, or initial health, or whether inequalities in the after-tax pricing of ~edical care aitigate or exacerbate health differentials.
Indeed, in on environ~ent in which health is c noraal consuMer good and ia i_nf luenced in part by the behavior of consu111er.s <consuieption of health-related gooc:l.s>, and aedical aervicea <"treat.aenta'"> ore aubetitutea for auch healthrelated gooda, it is not obvious that those with higher-incose=;will conauae aore treat•ent& even under a regiae in which the iMplicit price& of aedical treataenta ars not affected by inco•e. It is tbere!ora not poaaible to infer froa only the di&tribution of aedical services used by incoae clas& or by race whether agent& face different iaplicit prices for auch service&. ftoreover, o regiae in which treat•ent& are co~pleaentary to health-related goods could not be distinguished froa a regiae in which high-incoae agents <conau•era/producera of health> pay lower prices <net of taxes> for treataents.
Tcble 1 presents si~ple statistics on the incidence of four coaaon treatEtents provided to pregncnt woaen ccro&s race, incoiR~ . .and education classes, based on a probability saaple of all women havin~ a legitiaate live birth in 1980 in the United States. Among these woaen of aiailar. but by no aeana identical, pre-treatment health statue, there are soae striking differences in treatMent incidence. For exaMple, Black mothers were 40 percent !es& likely to have received an x-ray than White aothers but were claost 20 percent aore likely to have received a caesarean section; aaniocentesis was 50 percent lea& likely, x-rays 26 percent less likely and ccesarean section 24 percent less likely to have been provided to aothers whose husbands earned lee& than $6000 in 1979 coapared to aotheru whose husbands inco•e was at least 630000. Mothers with at least so•e college-level schooling, aoreover, were alao&t twice 88 likely 88 aothers with lesa than nine years of schooling to have received en x-roy while pregnant.
The inequities in aedical treataenta received by aocioeconoaic groups indicated in Table 1 do not i•ply that the less-healthy receive fewer treat•ents; it is possible that goods deleterious to <infent> health have Source: 1980 National Natality Followback Survey.
greater incoae elasticities, or health-augMenting goods have lower incoae · elaaticitiea than does health. For exoaple, highly-educated aothera aay postpone birth& relative to le&a-educated aothers, which aay be potentially horaful to infant health, requiring aore careful aonitoring and treataenta. In the absence of inforaation on pre-treataent health etatua it ia thus difficult to evaluate how fornal aedical services are distributed across agents.
In this pcper6 we examine how aediccl treat•ent& a&&ociated with care during pregnancy are distributed in the United States within and aero&• pretreataent health groups. The existence of a probe.bility aaaple of pregnant wo111en Cbirths> affords a special opportunity to study one group that is .relatively ho~ogeneous, but not identical, in health &tatus for whoM the .relevant aedical treetaenta are relatively a11all in nuaber end.whose relevant health-related behavior i& also well··docu11ented.1 Moreover, 11edical care provided to expectant mothers ia i11portant since it is care supplied si•ultaneously to two generations.
In section 1, we show that it ia possible to distinguish health care re9h.e& characterized, by di&tributiva QY.!. pricing •echanisa& <prices, sub&idie&,, rationing> with knowl9dge of the technology of pre-and poet-treataent health production, and by co•paring the overall distribution of treat~ents to individuals by their sociosconouic characteristics with the distribution within groups defined by their pre-treataent health stat~s. In section 2, we report estimates of how consu11ption decisions by the 11othera interact with the 111edical procedures to affect one salient health outco•e anasure, birthweight. In 
. where HJ > o,. J a 1,2. We will assune that the t:reataenta are a11teliorative, &ub&titut.es for. the X-good, $0 that ~H12 < O, but it i& only i11portant that ths efficacy of the treatiaent depend on pre-treataent health or X.
Agent i aaxiaize& hi& utility, given.by (3) where U3 > 0, J a 1,2~3, and Z is a non-health good, &ub3ect to a budget.
constraint:
where ri i& 09ant i'& incoae. pz and Px are price& of X and z. respectively, G&&uaed to be the &aDe aero&& all agent&, Pt<Fi> ia the price per treataent.
which aay be a function of incoae, and c is a f!~ad <capitation> fee. di&cu&&ed below.
Wa J\ay di&tingu!sh three aedical care regilles u&ing <4>. In the firat, "noraal ~arket" regiae CI>. traatMents are suppli~d as in an ordinary aarket uo and <7>, (8) where the •iJ ere the Hicks coapenaated substitution effects for good i with respect to the price of good J• When treatments and the health-related good X ere aubatitutes in production and conauaption, •xt > 0 end the leaa-heclthy c11on9 cgents vith identical inco11es receive aore treataents. Of co~r&o, if X o.nd health ere Gu:fficiently strong co11pleaenta in the welfare function <exercise end health?), it is possible that those agents consuaing high levels of X will also derAand nore trsat11enta, even if X and t are &ubatitutea in health productionJ the a&&ociation between pre-treataent health end the level of treataenta depends both on the health technology and on preferences.
Under a rationing regiae <III>. such a& one in which treataents are allocated across agent& ·to aaxiaize health value-added. as in <5>, however, the relationship between pre-treat~ent health <or health inputs> and treataenta depends solely on the·propertiea of the health technology: When treatments are allocated in 6 nQrJllnl market, <no agent-specific prices>, the conditional incoJlle effect on treatae~ts i& not zero, but is (10) dti*I dFi where dtil/dFi is tho reduced-fora income effect froa CG> and dtiwl/dFi is the conditional inco~e effect from <7> under regi~e I. The conditional incoRe effect will be positive, if X is a noraal good an1 Xi and heclth tre~t~ents are aubstitutes. Moreover, it is readily seen fro• <10> that treat~ents will vary aore strongly (and positively> with incoae among agents with the sa•e pretreat•ent health status than across all agents. This is ~erely the well-know~ result froa rationing theory, en application of ·LaChatelier's p1·inciple, that condition~l incoae effects exceed reduced-forJll incoae effects for goods that are substitutes for the .. rationed" good. Thus, if treatMents are.allocated in a 9 r regular aarket.
•controlling for" differentials in pre-treataent health increases diaporitiea in treataent by inco•e rather than reduces the•.
Wh~n treataent prices vary with incoae. the gifference between the healthconditioned income effect and the unconditional or reducod-for~ inco•e effect is given by
<11>
Here. because inco~e and price effects move together. when health-related consuMption goods and treatMents are substitute& ~nd Pt' < 0 <higher-income agents are subsidized>, the conditional inco•e effect on treataents May be leso than the unconditional effect--incoae-relcted disparities in treatments ~ay be emaller within groups of similar pre-treataent at~tus than across the whole population. If low-2ncoae agent& tend to receive the highest aedical care subaidiea, however, t.he relationship between income and treat•ents within health lroup& will be stronger than the association between incoae and treatments !or the overall population. as in the noraal aarket c~se. The intuition for the foraer result. which provides a <weak> test for the existence of a regressive health pricing regi~E.t~· is that expression <11> coiabines two well-known results fro• rationing theoz·y -that conditional exceed unconditional inco1te effect.s and ~onditional own (coMponsated> price effects ara w~aker than their unconditional counterparts for <nor~al> goods that are substitutes for the fixed good. If a ri&e in inco1te also lowers the treat11ent price. tt.e weakening of the price effect offsets the usual strengthening of the inc~Me effect.
Another reason why iltplicit treat11ent price.& 1u1y vary with inco111e is given in the household production literature <Becker, 1965; Acton, 1975> . If the value of tbe is hi9h9r for high-incoae agents and use of Medical care is a tiae-intensive activity, then the shifts in substitution and inco~e effects ecroaa oonditional end unconditional trectaent equation• reinforce ecch other.
Only if the iBplicit aubsidy to hi9h-inco11e agenta i& auff iciently high vill unconditional exce&d conditional incoae effects on treataenta.
Eatiaction of the health technology and of both reduced-for• end conditional Con health> treataent equation& thus provide& c aecns Ci) of eacertcining how aediccl treataenta ere allocated according to health &t3tua in a given he~lth-regiae, Cii) of coapcring the existing health-related trectaent allocation& to those that would exist under c "needa-bc&ad" syste11, end <iii> o! describing the acnner in which medical c~re coeta end incoae interact on balance~ in addition to providing Measures of incoae disparities in the allocation of Medical treatRent& within groups co~parable in pre-treataent health status.
·Prenatal Care end Birthweight e. The Data and 5p£cification of the Technology
The preceding discussion suggested th~t to a5sess how the prevailing aedical care regiae influence& the distribution of aedicel services across heterogeneous agents requires inforMation not only on agents' socioecono~ic ,qharacteristics ~nd l'.~dical treataents received, but also on agents' prebeat•ent health statuu ·and on behavior relevant to health. Such an analysis of the distribution of aadical treataents caong adults would be heroic indeed.
There is en anorMous rango of behavior that M6Y potentially relate to health and aany health indicators. Moreover, infor~ation on the entire life-history of each agent would presumably be required. The analysis of prenatal infant care, however, is aore feasible since the life-history cf the relevant agent is necessarily short, specific indicators of health appear to be More salient than other&, and the nuabe• of beh~viors and treatasnt& potentially relevant to birth outco•es ia relatively s~all. We eaploy a& our indicator of early child health the weight of the child ct birth. a salient preoictor of both infant 11ortality and subsequent health and intellectual achievement <National Academy of Sciences, 1985 aother, and the rapidity with which prenatal care was first sought by the Mother after conception signi£icantly affected birthweight and fetal growth. However, we dld not exaaine the effect& of these inputs net of subsequent prenatal aedical treatment& nor the interactions between tr~atments and the parentallychosen inputs, due to the lack of information on aedical services in those.
ear lier data.
In the present analysis we examine the influence on birthweight of the .pre- Of the four treat~ent& adainiatered to pregnant woaen considered here--aaniocente&ia, ultrasound, x-ray, and caesarean &ection--the first three are used to confira fetal develop•ent and position during pregnancy. whereas the caesarean section procedure pGrtain& to the actual delivery of the infant. The first three procedure& applied during the pregnancy thus ~ay directly affect the ~evelopaent of the fetu& and are included aaong the determinants of birthweight.
As discussed, neither the pre-treatMent health behavior of parents nor the treatments are likely to be randosly allocated. In addition to the endogeneou& treataent variable.sand pre-treat•ent birth charact~ristics, we also include in the specification of the birthweight technology four characteristic& of the birth and the aother not subJect to choice but likely to be related to birthweight--the height and race of the 11other, the &ex of the infant and whether or not the birth is part of a multiple birth <plural>. Inclusion of the race of the Qother <Black or not-Black> enables a test of the hypothesis that racial differences in birthweight can be explained solely in ter11ts of differences in parent behavior and/or a different incidence of formal, prenatal Medical treataents.
E&timation of the birthweight technology using consistent aethods also Adverse &9lection by •others is evident in the estiaate& of the consequence& of delay by the aother& in &eein9 a doctor while pre9nant. The nu~ber of aonths that elapse into the pregnancy prior to a doctor visit is positively and significantly associated with birthweight according to the (biased> OLS esti~ates, but is negatively and insignificantly related to birthwei9ht in the two-stage estiMates. This strong selection bias was also found in our prior work on the earlier saMple. The nuMber of prenatal care visit& the woaan had at the tiMe of her delivery, however, is positively associated with her having a larger baby whichever estiMation procedure is used--the two-stage estiaate& in coluan 2 suggest that added prenatal visits exert a saall but not insignificant · benefit to the child's birthweight of 26 grass per visit. The 9ross quantitative effect of prenatal visits, •oreover, i& not reduced when the various aedical treatments that •ight occur during such visits are explicitly entered into the second specification of the birthweight production function.
The estiaates indicate that a •other who had, say, five visits rather than the sa~ple average of ll w9uld incur a deficit in her child's birthweight of about 140 graas or 4.2 perGent, on average (i.e., 24 x 5.9 = 142>.
The t~o-stage luast squares estimates also a~~i9n substanti~l i~portance to the •other's age in influencing the baby's birthwcight: fertility ti•ing is iaportant. The optimal •eternal age .at birth is 26 in all specification&.
The ~agnitude of the estimated TSLS age gradient is substantial: a mother at a9e
18 or 34 could expect according to the esti•ate~ in col. (4) of In the third specification. the estiaate& indicate that the birthweight effects of both amniocentesis and fetcl x-rays vary significantly with the characteristics of the fetus and P-other& with. however. ultrasound again being insignificantly rel~ted to birthwaight. In particular, amniocentesis enhances the weight of babie~ at birth when the births are plural, and fetal x-rays appear to reduce bir·thweight ~ost for older Mothero and for higher-parity births. but are beneficial when the births are plural. That is, among young mothers having their first birth and carrying •ore.than one baby, x-rays on net ~ay aid in increasing birthweight. Treataents thus mattor for birth outco~e&, and their effects depend on the pre-treatment choices of parents. speci ficat l or1s. b. A~~lute values of t-ratios be~~ath coefficients in coilli"iin. c. Absolute values of as}'lllptotic t-ratios l'i!meath coefficients in columr .. the aother, for given huaband'a incoMe, will More nearly corre&pond to pure inco•e effecta, oa leaa than one-half of aarried woaen below age 49 hold fulltiae JOb&. Schooling aay al&o reflect health <tiae> preference, ond/or abilities to produce <pre-treataent) health <Gro&&Dan, 19721 fucha, 1982; Haveaan and Wolfe, 1984) . If aother'a schooling i& a&&ocicted positively with preference& for health. given price& and incoae, or schooling augaent& household and aarket productivity equally, the difference between reduced-fora end conditional •other'& schooling effect& on treataent& would be &iailar to that a&&ociated with pure incoae effects. If. a& noted above, those woaen with higher lE1vel& ·Of schooling have higher opportunity cost& of th1e, and receiving treatllents i& a tiae-intansive activity, then conditional will exceed reducedfora schooling effect& even if pure incoae effect& are saall or non-existent • . The.correspondence& between the reduced-for11 and conditional Con pre-treat.1tent parity, receive aedical care le&& frequently and later after conception. and are aore exposed to aatornal aaoking. The aothera of auch infanta are also significantly le&& likely to receive aaniocente&ia and x-ray& while pregnant, and are le&a likely to receive a caesarean section at the birth of the child <particularly, in the latter case, for ~others with husbands earning less than $6000 per year>. Infant& born to leas-educated •others, given their father's schooling and incoae, tend to be born earlier in the mother's life-cycle, and to be of higher parity. Such 11others also &eek prenatal care le&& frequently and less-rapidly, saoke aore while pregnant and are le&s likely to receive x-rays and e cses8rean sectJ.on.
For given parental socioeconomic characteristics. Black infants also have different <endo9enoU$) cliaracteristic& co11pared to White infants--they tend to be of lower parity and to receive prenatal aedical care &i9nificantly ln& rapidly and less frequently. Black 11other& are no less likely, however, given _their incone and education. to receive ultra-sound, x-ray& or a caesarean section than are White mothers, but are significantly less likely to receive oaniocentasis. The gross differentials by race in the incidence of Medical &ervices among pregn~nt women evident in Table 1 ~an thus al•ost wholly be accounted for by racial differences in parents' education and incoae. However.
Black infant& differ in endogenous c~aracteristics fro• infants born to White aothers, as is evident in columns 1 through 5 in Table 3 . Horeovor, Black infants, for given pre-treataent inputs, are &~~ller than White infant& <Table 2>. Thus, the absence of &i9ni:ficant treatl'llent differentials in the reducedfora equations does not i11ply that there are no racial differentials in the incidence of medical treat~ent among in!~nt& £.Q.
•parable in health-related chorocteriatica. To aaaeaa thi• diatributional ia.sue, o& noted at the outset, requires that the deterainant& of treataent& be assessed "controlling for" pretreataent conditiona,which we exaldne below.
d.
Conditional Treat~ent Eguctipn& Table 4 for ell but aaniocentesis, these hypotheses are ~eJected at ct least the .01 level; both hypotheses are re3ected ct the .10 level for amniocentesis. Thus.· the re~ults reported in Table 4 suggest that net of the i11portant health-relatGd characteristic& of infants determined in part by parents. parental inco~e and schooling play en additional role in who gets treat~ents.5 The regi•e of equal treatnents for e~ucl conditions does not appear to characterize the allocation of Medical care, circa 1980 in the United State&g with respect to pregnant wo11en.
The estinata5 in Table 4 
Cl Likelihood ratio tests.
caesarean &ection but are le&& likely to receive ultra&ound.6 Consistent with the estiaotea in Table 2 indicating that o•niocente&ia and x-rays ai9nificantly augMent the birthweight of babies born in a plural birth, both procedures Cos well o& ultrasound ond caesarean section> are significantly ~ore likely to be applied when there i& a plural birth. Despite, however, the finding reported in Table 2 that x-ray& lower birthwei9ht for higher-parity births born to older Mothers, such treataents appear to be provided More frequently to such births.
But, of course, x-rays and the other procedures ~ay aid in aMeliorating other conditions associated with aaternal age ond parity than weight at birth.
Which of the two alternative aarket regines characterizing the allocation .of Medical treat~ents doainates--the regressive tax-subsidy regiae CII> or the Market regiae? Infant health and the set of prenatal treat11ents appear to be substitutes, as indicated by the reduced-for~ endowment effects on the probabilities of tre<:1tl!lents in Table 3 . The income eff.ects on treat:aents ~hould therefore be algebraically higher when esti11ated conditional on endogenous infant health attributes compared to the esti•ated inco•e effects froa the · reduced for11s. wh€m thG 11arket regi111e is characterized by income-independent prices. If i~plicit prices fall sufficiently with income, however, the conditional "income affects"' will be smaller than the unconditional incoae e:f:f'ects.
In the case of the three treat~ents for which we can reJect with confiden~e the hypothesis that .their provision depends solely on the health-related conditions of the pregnancy. the change in the coefficient associated·with th~ identical pre-treat•ent health conditions--Black "others otherwise identical with respect to both pre-treataent birth charact~ristics and schooling and inco~e are significantly less likely to receive amniocentesis and x-rays and are
Marginally aore likely to receive a caesarean section compared to White P.others.8 The l~tter differential is consistent with the evidence concerning racial differences in pelvic structure; however, the lower likelihood of receiving a•niocentesis and x-ray& a•ong Blacks i& surprising given the evidence in Table 2 that even for given parental inputs Slack babies are frailer than White babies. It is notable that differences in pre-treat~ent behaviors across race groups, not accounted for in the reduced-foras or in the gross racial differentials displayed in Table 1 , aask significant racial disparities in treataent incidence. These differentials by race were not apparent in either the gross treatsent rates by race <Table 1> or in the reduced-fora equations accounting for the incidence of treat1tents by race controlling only for socioeconoaic status. · Controlling for <endogenous> initial health status c:;an be i11portant for understanding how the health care systea allocates aedical treat•ents acro&s sc;cioecono:aic groups.
Conclusion
In this paper we have exaained how aedical traataents are distributed aaon9 pregnant women according to both their initial health ~nd their econoaic resources under different iaplicit pricing regiaes-for allocating aedicol &ervicea. We showed that when the following three conditions hold--<i> aedical treataents and pre-trectaent health status are subatitutes in the sense that treat11ents ere aaeHorati·ve; <ii> pre-treatment health is influenced by agents' behavior: and Ciii> trectMents are allocated in a •arket with unifora prices--then differences in health status prior to treatment will not only not account for disparities in treatment by inco:ae end education, but such disparities will be greeter within groups of identical pre-treatment health status then across such groups in the entire population.
Based on a probability sc11ple of :acrried pregnant women having c legitbate live birth in 1980 in the United States, we found that Ci> more-educated woaen and wo111en with husbunds havlng higher incoaes receive a disproportionate share of the four aaJor treat•ents studied. Cii> the prenatal treat~enta are aore likely to be provided to leas-healthy infant& CJRother.a> within achooling and inco•e groups, and (iii) treataent differential& by education and incoae are increased by controlling for tho&e behav.iora that affect the pre-treataent healthiness of the infanta The re&ult& thu& are consistent with the existence of a ~arket regiae for aedical care that allocate& health treatMent& to tho&e who demand thea. whether the deaand i& due to superior knowledge of the benefits of health, greater resources, or preferences. We thus could not find evidence that the tax subsidization of health care dominantly influences the allocation · · of these foras of 11\edica-l care, nor evidence that health-related subsidies targated to the poor hGva aliBinated income disparities in treat•ents.
It is also shown that the healthiness of the mother and child. net of the ·.influences of both p1·enatal input& and treat11ent&., may Jointly affect pretreataent parental decigion& and the use of subsequent treataents. We found that, as expected, xother& of healthier infant& were more likely to postpone seeing a doctor. visited the doctor less often, and were le&& likely to receive treat11e~ts while pregnant. This coMpensatory allocation of ~edical services, co11bined with the inability to measure directly all contributions to pre- 
4.
The two-€tage probit esti•ation procedure and tests for endogeneity are discussed in Newey <1985> and Saith and Blundell <1986>.
5.
Note th~t we cannot use our esti•ates from Table 4 to coapute the distribution of treatMents under a regiMe in which only the efficacy of the treat~ents <pre-treatment health) aatters, ~s in a compulsory health · insurance regi~e, based on the pre-treat11ent. variable coefficients. This is because a change in the pricin-;J of Medical services would induce a corresponding change in the distribution of pre-treatment health-related consu11ption goods C11oral hazard>.
6. While the ti11ing of.the first visit Cdelay> to a doctor or clinic by the Mother is a decision 11ade_principally by the 11other and represents c pretreatJJ.ent ••conditlon"' which the doctor 111ay need to taka into account, the nu~ber of prenatal visits reflects the treat•ents provided and is thus influenced aG ~ell by the doctor. The numbsr of visits by the mother to the doctor is ~ot the~efore e111ployed as a MGasure of pre-treat~ent health status in estb1atin9 the deter11immts of tn~at11ent incidence net of pretreataent heal~h conditions.
7.
If education and income were 11erely proxies for pre-treat•ent health conditions not reflected in the other behavioral variables, they would be negatively correlated with the probability of receiving a treat111ent, if health i& a nor~al good. Thi& i& because. a& &een in Table 3 . treat~ent& are aore likely to be provided to le&&-healthy infant&/aother&. .0724 (.0177) .20s (.0235) .0582 (. 0217) .0861 ( .0245) . .0268 ( .161) .0781 (.268) .308 ( .461) .00941 (. 0966) .00182 (. 0426) .0453 (.208) .0258 (.159) Father origin Irish J. 
